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Internationalization enables multinational corporations (MNCs) to diversify their source and type of debt as well as 
earnings, although doing so incurs agency costs of debt and business risk. To mitigate these costs, existing studies find 
that MNCs typically have lower levels of long-term debt than domestic corporations (DCs). One key limitation of these 
studies is their failure to recognize the heterogeneity of debt, specifically the equity options embedded in the debt issued 
by MNCs. We show that in the presence of agency costs of debt and business risk, MNCs are able to mitigate the 
negative effects on long-term debt by utilizing convertible debt in their debt structure, as compared to DCs. Therefore, 
MNCs are able to sustain higher levels of long-term debt to make the most from international diversification. 
Relatively, the significance of business risk is found to outweigh the significance of agency costs as MNCs further 
increase their degree of internationalization. Evidence also shows that the issuers of convertible debt are not dominated 
by smaller and riskier growth firms, but is linked to internationalization.  
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In the presence of agency costs of debt and business risk, multinational corporations (hereafter 
MNCs) are found to decrease their long-term debt by decreasing non-convertible debt, but the net 
decrease in the long-term debt is mitigated by convertible debt. Conversely, domestic corporations 
(hereafter DCs) are found to decrease convertible and non-convertible debt to mitigate agency costs 
of debt. Business risk is found to be insignificant in affecting DCs’ choice of long-term debt. 
Therefore we claim; MNCs are able to mitigate the agency costs and business risk from 
internationalization by issuing convertible debt.     
 
 Our findings also imply the importance of recognizing the heterogeneous feature of long-
term debt. Existing studies that centre on the leverage between MNCs and DCs share a similarity, 
that is long-term debt is assumed to be homogeneous. In fact, additional insight can be attained 
when debt heterogeneity is recognized because different types of debt have difference cash flow 
claims, control provisions and sensitivity to information (Rauh and Sufi, 2010).  
 
In this study, we recognize the heterogeneous feature of long-term debt by convertible and 
non-convertible debt to provide an alternative justification that enables MNCs to sustain higher 
levels of long-term debt in the presence of agency costs of debt and business risk. This is because 
MNCs are found to use more short-term debt than DCs in the effort of mitigating agency costs of 
debt (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004). But there are disadvantages of 
short-term debt. Firms are exposed to higher refinancing and interest rate risks due to the frequent 
rollover of short-term debt. Furthermore, it is advisable for MNCs that are likely to have higher 
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investment opportunities than DCs to take advantage of the heterogeneous feature of long-term debt 
in financing their capital expenditure to maximise the benefits of internationalization. 
 
We consider only the choice between convertible and non-convertible debt because the 
equity option, embedded in convertible debt is the key feature that differentiates these two types of 
debt. The equity option allows the convertible debtholder to forgo the fixed-income component to 
convert into the underlying equity to participate in any increase of the shareholders value. The 
conversion into equity is able to restore value maximizing incentives, thus mitigate the distortionary 
incentives created by risky debt. Therefore, risk-shifting hypothesis claims that convertible debt is 
designed to mitigate the debtholder-shareholder agency costs (Green, 1984). On the other hand, 
convertible debt is also claimed to be the preferred choice over straight debt and equity to mitigate 
financial distress costs (Stein, 1992). 
 
We identify three important contributions. First, we highlight the importance of recognizing 
the heterogeneous characteristic of long-term debt to mitigate the negative impact of agency costs 
of debt and business risk on the MNCs long-term debt level. This allows us to show that MNCs can 
utilize the embedded equity options of convertible debt to moderate the net negative effect on long-
term debt. Second, we construct our samples into MNCs by different degree of internationalization 
and DCs. By doing so, we are able to provide evidence that debt heterogeneity, agency costs and 
business risk are linked to the degree of internationalization. Third, this study contributes to the 
convertible debt literature related to the motivation for the issuance of this security from the 
international perspective. 
 
To provide robust evidence, we construct the MNCs by three different minimum level of 
internationalization that is 10% (MNC10), 25% (MNC25) and 50% (MNC50). Foreign sales ratio is 
the commonly used measure for degree of internationalization. But since the reported sales figures 
may include sales by foreign subsidiaries and export by parent companies, we also filter the MNCs 
by foreign tax ratio. Hence, exports by parent companies can be excluded since exports are 
considered as locally taxed revenues. This is to avoid any potential bias created due to the 
identification process.  For comparison, a sample of DCs is defined. A DC is defined as a firm that 
reports no foreign sales and foreign tax.   
 
In an overall view, agency costs of debt and business risk are positively related to MNCs 
decision to use convertible debt as compared to DCs. But relatively, the significance of business 
risk is found to outweigh the significance of agency costs as MNCs further increase their degree of 
internationalization to 50% or more. As for DCs, business risk is found to be insignificant. Instead, 
DCs is reported to decrease convertible and non-convertible debt in the presence of agency costs. 
Our findings remain consistent even controlling for the key firm characteristics associated with 
intangibility such as profitability, tangibility and growth opportunity (Park et al., 2013), as well as 
market conditions such as the recent global financial crisis and the subsequent quantitative easing 
policy. 
 
We also provide evidence to justify that the issuers of convertible debt is not dominated by 
smaller and riskier growth firms, represented by NASDAQ-listed MNCs and DCs. NASDAQ and 
non-NASDAQ-listed MNCs are found to use convertible debt to mitigate the agency costs of debt 
and business risk, respectively, with the increasing degree of internationalization. On the contrary, 
both agency costs and business risk are found to have insignificant positive relationship with 
convertible debt for the NASDAQ and non-NASDAQ-listed DCs.  Accordingly, we emphasize that 
the mitigation of agency costs and business risk is also linked to internationalization. 
  
 Moreover, we rank our samples of MNCs and DCs by their total assets to classify them into 
Bottom30 and Top30 that justifies, issuers of convertible debt is not dominated by smaller size firm. 
 
MNCs in Bottom30 and Top30 are found to mitigate the negative effect of business risk by issuing 
convertible debt, but this finding is insignificant for the Bottom30 and Top30 DCs. Additionally, 
larger size MNCs in Bottom30 are found to use convertible debt instead of non-convertible debt, 
but it is the opposite for DCs. Though, agency costs are found to have insignificant effect on the 
Bottom30 and Top30 MNCs’ convertible debt level, it has significantly negative effect on the 
Top30 DCs’ convertible debt level. Taken together, these findings also suggest that the decision to 
use convertible debt in mitigating either the agency costs or business risk is related to 
internationalization.  
 
This study is structured as follows: next, a review of the literature is undertaken. Then in 
Section 3 the data and methods used in this study are established; Section 4 provides the empirical 
results and discussion, while the final Section 5 presents the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Research Background 
 
Internationalization should enable MNCs to sustain higher leverage than DCs because international 
diversification of earnings can reduce overall bankruptcy risk in turn leading to a lower cost of debt 
financing (Hughes et al., 1975; Rugman, 1976). Nonetheless, empirical results have provided 
inconsistent evidence. US MNCs are found to utilize lower levels of long-term debt in their capital 
structure than DCs after controlling for firm size and industry effects (Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 
1997; Fatemi, 1988; Lee and Kwok, 1988).On the other hand, a recent study by Park, et al. (2013) 
reports insignificant difference between the leverage levels of US MNCs and DCs when the 
analyses control for the key firm characteristics associated with intangibility, such as high 
profitability, low asset tangibility, and high growth potential. But note that Park, et al (2013) 
construct their samples of MNCs and DCs with a higher cut-off level of $1 billion in book assets 
than the aforementioned studies.  
 
Evidence from the non-US markets show mixed results. For example, the Japanese MNCs 
are found to be less levered than the DCs though multinationality is found to be a significant aspect 
of leverage (Akhtar and Oliver, 2009). Alternately, Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) find a positive 
relationship between the degree of internationalization and leverage for the French MNCs, in 
comparison to DCs. The same positive relationship is observed by Mittoo and Zhang (2008) for the 
Canadian MNCs but the finding is mainly from their US operations. As for the expansion to non-
US markets, there is little impact on the leverage. As for the Australian MNCs, insignificant 
difference in the levels of leverage is reported between the MNCs and DCs (Akhtar, 2005). 
 
Though several justifications have been put forward to explain the less leveraged US MNCs 
than DCs, the agency costs of debt have been one of the most cited theories in explaining the lower 
debt ratios of MNCs (Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997; Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; Lee and 
Kwok, 1988). The benefits from international diversification are claimed to be offset by the 
systematic differences in the agency costs of debt between MNCs and DCs (Burgman, 1996). The 
adverse effect of agency costs of debt on the MNCs’ leverage levels increase with the increasing 
degree of internationalization (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003).Therefore, MNCs tend to use lower 
levels of long-term debt to deal with the higher agency costs (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; Fatemi, 
1988).  
 
Literature suggests that MNCs have high growth potential because these firms have greater 
access to larger markets than DCs (Lee and Kwok, 1988; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008). But, firms with 
high growth opportunities lead to suboptimal investment decisions, explained by the 
 
underinvestment hypothesis. Shareholders would reject value enhancing investment opportunities if 
the benefits of accepting these projects accrue mostly to debtholders instead of shareholders (Myers, 
1984). In order to mitigate these agency costs, MNCs maintain lower levels of long-term debt than 
DCs.  
 
In addition, business risk is another important determinant of leverage. MNCs may expose 
to greater uncertainties as the extant of internationalization increases. According to the trade-off 
theory, higher business risk translates into higher expected financial distress costs. Therefore, to 
mitigate the increased bankruptcy risk, MNCs decrease their long-term debt financing (Burgman, 
1996; Chen et al., 1997) to maintain their debt capacity (Park et al., 2013). Mittoo and Zhang (2008) 
find significantly negative effect of business risk on the leverage of US MNCs. But the negative 
effect is insignificant for the Canadian MNCs, which is consistent with Kwok and Reeb’s (2000) 
upstream-downstream hypothesis that examines the different effects of MNCs’ business risk based 
on the relative risks in the home and target countries.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
 
Risk-shifting hypothesis argues that firms substitute convertible debt for straight debt to mitigate 
the potential debtholders-shareholders conflicts of interest (Green, 1984). This argument is 
developed from the asset substitution problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Shareholders are 
claimed to have incentive to shift risk to debtholders by overinvesting in high-risk investment 
projects, thus transferring debtholders’ wealth to shareholders through falling debt prices and higher 
credit spreads. In turn, risk-shifting increases the probability of financial distress that translate into a 
large loss in value from underinvestment, specifically for high-growth firms (Jen et al., 
1997).Though issuance of equity can alleviate the agency costs related to risky straight debt 
financing, it may incur other equity-related costs, such as the forgone interest tax shield or the 
excessive managerial costs that may outweigh the benefits of reducing the risk-shifting problem 
(Lewis et al., 1999).  
 
The potential debtholders-shareholders conflicts of interest can be resolved by utilising the 
embedded equity option of convertible debt. These options enable the debtholders to convert their 
claims into equity to participate in any increase of the shareholders’ value, thus reducing the 
expropriation of wealth. All else equal, the greater the opportunities to expropriate the debtholders’ 
value through high-risk investment projects, the larger the post-conversion equity ownership that 
should be allocated to the convertible debt holders (Lewis et al., 1999). For these reasons, MNCs 
that face agency costs of debt are expected to use more convertible debt, but less non-convertible 
debt to mitigate the agency conflicts. Consequently, MNCs can sustain higher levels of long-term 
debt to make the most from international diversification.  
 
Hypothesis 1: US MNCs can utilize convertible debt to mitigate the agency costs of debt. 
 
Alternately, firms with high financial distress costs are claimed to prefer equity than debt 
(Stein, 1992). But if these firms also face significant adverse selection costs due to informational 
asymmetries between firms’ managers and investors, equity becomes less attractive because the 
value is sensitive to the subsequent disclosure of the firms’ private information. Likewise, in the 
presence of high financial distress costs, the less informative sensitive straight debt becomes less 
attractive to mitigate the adverse selection costs because the financial distress costs could 
potentially outweigh the adverse selection costs.  
 
Therefore the backdoor equity financing hypothesis suggests that under high adverse 
selection costs, firms with high expected financial distress costs tend to issue convertible debt as a 
substitute for equity (Stein, 1992), which also explain the reason growth firms find it more 
 
attractive to issue convertible debt. Moreover, growth firm managers may be reluctant to issue 
equity if the prevailing stock price does not adequately reflect the firm’s growth opportunities since 
it may dilute existing shareholders’ claims. The intuition of backdoor equity financing hypothesis is 
based on the trade-off between the financial distress costs of straight debt and the adverse selection 
costs of equity. Hence under these circumstances, firms are expected to issue convertible debt.  
 
Additionally, the upstream-downstream hypothesis (Kwok and Reeb, 2000) argues that as 
MNCs extend their business operations from a more stable market, such as US, to less stable 
markets or non US markets (going downstream), there will be an increase in the MNCs business 
risk because of greater uncertainties and information asymmetries. Evidence shows that MNCs 
maintain lower leverage to mitigate the higher business risk. But, the weaker country specific 
corporate governance qualities of the less stable markets are found to encourage the issuance of 
convertible debt (Dutordoir et al., 2014). Therefore with the same intuition, these MNCs are 
expected to utilize more convertible debt, but less non-convertible debt to mitigate business risk 
from internationalization to sustain higher levels of long-term debt. 
 
Hypothesis 2: US MNCs can utilize convertible debt to mitigate the business risk. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 14 requires an issuer to report its 
revenues, operating profit (loss), and identifiable assets if a segment’s revenues, operating profit or 
identifiable assets are 10% or more of related consolidated amounts. Equally, a firm is defined as 
MNC when the degree of internationalization is greater than or equals to 10%, which is also 
consistent with the existing studies (Akhtar, 2005; Burgman, 1996; Lee and Kwok, 1988; Mittoo 
and Zhang, 2008). In this study, we use the commonly used foreign sales ratio as the proxy for the 
degree of internationalization, measured as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. Since the 
reported sales figures may include both sales by foreign subsidiaries and exports by the parent 
company (Burgman, 1996; Lee and Kwok, 1988), the firms are also filtered by foreign tax ratio so 
that exports by parent companies that are considered as locally taxed revenues can be excluded to 
avoid from potential bias.  
 
Three samples of MNCs; MNC10, MNC25 and MNC50 are identified from the Compustat 
database for the fiscal year from 2002 to 2011, in which both the foreign sales ratio and the foreign 
tax ratio are greater than or equal to 10%, 25% and 50%, respectively. MNC10 consists of 726 
MNCs with 3,449 firm-year observations; MNC25 consists of 563 MNCs with 2,425 firm-year 
observations, whereas MNC50 consists of 275 MNCs with 949 firm-year observations. For 
comparison, a sample of DCs is also defined, consisting of 684 firms with 3,329 firm-year 
observations. A DC is defined as a firm that reports no foreign sales and foreign tax. 
 
These samples are obtained after excluding the regulated firms (SIC coded 4000-4999) and 
financial firms (SIC coded 6000-6999), all equity firms, firms with negative growth opportunities, 
firms that have less than four years of observations for the business risk measure, and firms with 
total assets below $10 million to control for potential bias in size differences between MNCs and 
DCs (Chen et al., 1997; Lee and Kwok, 1988). Any firm-year observations with missing financial 
information for the observed variables are also excluded. Firms that have observations in both the 
MNC and DC samples are also excluded, to control for DCs that later expand their operations 
internationally, within our observation period. Also, the samples are limited to the US incorporated 
 
firms that are publicly traded on major exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and NASDAQ.  
 
3.2 Variables Selection 
 
The data for the identified variables are also from Compustat. Firm’s leverage is measured by the 
long-term debt ratio scaled by total capital, the sum of long-term debt and market value of 
shareholders’ equity (Akhtar and Oliver, 2009; Burgman, 1996; Lee and Kwok, 1988; Singh and 
Nejadmalayeri, 2004). Then, we identify long-term debt by convertible and non-convertible debt. 
Both are also scaled by total capital.  
 
Agency cost of debt is measured by market-to-book ratio (Chen et al., 1997; Lewis et al., 
1999; Park et al., 2013; Rauh and Sufi, 2010). We take the natural log of the market-to-book ratio to 
smooth the distribution of the ratio. Higher market-to-book ratio signifies higher agency costs of 
underinvestment and risk-shifting. Though internationalization enables MNCs to better exploit 
potential growth opportunities than DCs, it also leads to higher agency cost, thus lower levels of 
long-term debt than DCs (Akhtar, 2005; Akhtar and Oliver, 2009; Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 
1997; Fatemi, 1988; Lee and Kwok, 1988). Supported by the risk-shifting hypothesis, MNCs with 
higher agency costs are expected to have less long-term debt and non-convertible debt but more 
convertible debt.  
 
Business risk is measured by the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) over sales of four years. Trade-off theory claims that as risk increases, firms’ debt capacity 
decreases because of the increasing probability of financial distress. Evidence shows that issuers of 
convertible debt tend to be riskier than issuers of non-convertible debt or equivalent (Lewis et al., 
1999). Moreover, risk is positively related to the use of convertible debt (Chang et al., 2004; Jen et 
al., 1997).  Issuers with higher expected financial distress costs issue convertible debt to reduce the 
financial risk (Jen et al., 1997). Therefore, riskier firms, in our study MNCs with higher degree of 
internationalization, are expected to prefer convertible debt over non-convertible debt, as compared 
to DCs. 
 
Degree of internationalization, measured by the foreign sales ratio is also considered. It is 
meant to control for the effect of the extent of foreign involvement on long-term debt as well as the 
choice between convertible and non-convertible debt in each sample of MNCs. Higher degree of 
internationalization denotes greater extent of foreign involvement. MNCs with higher degree of 
internationalization are expected to use less long-term debt and non-convertible debt because of the 
increasing agency costs (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003) and business risk (Burgman, 1996; Chen et 
al., 1997). Conversely, MNCs are expected to use more convertible debt, supported by the risk-
shifting hypothesis and backdoor equity hypothesis that convertible debt is designed to mitigate the 
agency costs between financial claimants (Green, 1984) and financial distress costs (Stein, 1992), 
respectively.  
 
Control variables are also included to account for trade-off and pecking order theories. Firm 
size is measured by the natural log of total assets that is included to control for any effects related to 
firm size.  Firm size is claimed to be positively related to leverage (Lewis et al., 1999; Mittoo and 
Zhang, 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Firm size also measures the magnitude of financial 
distress costs. Larger size firms are expected to have lower financial distress costs, thus allowing 
the firm to tolerate a higher level of leverage. Moreover, firm size is considered as the measure of 
degree of information asymmetry (Lewis et al., 1999). Large firms are more likely to issue straight 
debt because these firms face less information asymmetry as large firms tends to be more mature 
and established. Conversely, convertible debt issuers tend to be smaller and riskier than straight 
debt issuers that are potentially vulnerable to adverse selection problems (Lewis et al., 1999).  
 
 
Tangibility represents the collateral available for debt financing. According to the trade-off 
theory, firms with more tangible assets are expected to have higher leverage due to lower default 
costs and less debt-related agency problems (Mittoo and Zhang, 2008; Rauh and Sufi, 2010). In this 
study, tangibility is measured by the ratio of net plant and equipment to total assets (Jen et al., 
1997). Firms with higher tangible assets are claimed to have more collateral for debt issuance and a 
higher liquidation value in the event of bankruptcy (Deesomsak et al., 2004). Therefore, there is 
higher incentive for the issuance of straight debt equivalents. Mayers (1998) shows that convertible 
debt issuers tend to have lower than the industry median ratio of tangible to total assets. Also Jen et 
al. (1997) add that the value of growth firms are largely through investment opportunities rather 
than tangible assets, thus these firms are more likely to issue convertible debt. Accordingly, MNCs 
with higher tangible assets are predicted to be positively related to long-term debt and non-
convertible debt but negatively related to convertible debt.  
 
Profitability, measured by the return on assets is meant to control for the pecking order 
hypothesis of Myers (1984), which argues that firms would follow a financing hierarchy, with 
retained earnings being the most preferred choice for financing, followed by debt, equity, and 
convertible debt in between. Profitable firms are found to use less debt (Mittoo and Zhang, 2008; 
Rauh and Sufi, 2010). Similarly in our study, an inverse relationship is expected between 
profitability and level of leverage, but when convertible debt is compared with non-convertible 
debt, profitable MNCs are expected to utilise higher levels of non-convertible as compared to 
convertible debt because of informational asymmetry between managers and investors (Deesomsak 
et al., 2004).  
 
Moreover, Dummy Both is added to control for firms that have both convertible debt and 
non-convertible debt in their debt structure. It is a dummy equal to one if the issuer’s debt structure 
consists of both types of debt and zero otherwise. Dummy Crisis and Quantitative Easing are 
included to control for the effects of market environment. Dummy Crisis equals to one for 
observations from year 2007 to 2009 that control for the effects of the 2007-2009 Global Financial 
Crisis. Alternately, quantitative easing is introduced when the interest rates are close to zero, in 
which central banks buys financial securities to create new money in order to stimulate the 
economy. Quantitative Easing I spans from November 25, 2008 to March 2010, whereas 
Quantitative Easing II spans from November 2010 to June 2011. Since this study consists of annual 
observation, the Quantitative Easing variable can only be approximated, in which it equals to one 




Since the dataset have dimensions of both cross-sectional and time-series, we use panel data 
regression because it provides more robust analysis (Akhtar, 2005). Moreover, there could be 
potential bias due to correlation of the error terms across years if we use the cross-sectional 
regression to analyze the panel data. To decide between the fixed and random effects, the Hausman 
test is performed. If the error terms are correlated with the explanatory variables, then fixed effects 
are preferred over random effects.  
 
Equation 1: Fixed effects panel regression 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 ,𝑡 + 
𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  
 
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
 
Equation 2: Random effects panel regression 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 ,𝑡 + 
𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡  
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Sample Description 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics (Panel A) and the mean differences of the identified variables 
between MNCs and DCs (Panel B). MNCs are found to use less long-term debt as compared to 
DCs, consistent with previous studies (Akhtar and Oliver, 2009; Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997; 
Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; Fatemi, 1988; Lee and Kwok, 1988). On average, MNCs and DCs 
maintain about 17.3% and 20.4% of long-term debt, respectively in their financial structure. 
Interestingly, when we examine their debt structure, MNCs are found to have increasing levels of 
convertible debt, but decreasing level of non-convertible debt with the increasing degree of 
internationalization. On the contrary, DCs use less convertible debt, but more non-convertible debt 
in their debt structure.  
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics and Mean Differences by Different Degree of Internationalization 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
    
Variable 













Long-term debt ratio 0.173 0.136 0.170 0.134 0.174 0.144 0.204 0.169 
Convertible debt ratio 0.025 0.065 0.026 0.067 0.031 0.078 0.019 0.057 
Non-convertible debt ratio 0.148 0.134 0.144 0.131 0.143 0.140 0.185 0.170 
Agency cost 0.989 0.667 0.996 0.659 0.998 0.713 0.942 0.752 
Business risk 0.057 0.926 0.066 1.103 0.114 1.759 0.483 4.103 
Degree of internationalization 0.461 0.197 0.530 0.167 0.671 0.115 0.000 0.000 
Size 7.687 1.650 7.751 1.677 7.627 1.672 6.282 1.834 
Tangibility 0.221 0.168 0.216 0.164 0.236 0.168 0.359 0.267 
Profitability 0.052 0.083 0.049 0.077 0.042 0.086 0.016 0.186 
Dummy Both 0.174 0.379 0.179 0.383 0.183 0.387 0.117 0.322 
Dummy crisis 0.302 0.459 0.306 0.461 0.314 0.464 0.289 0.453 
Quantitative easing 0.353 0.478 0.368 0.482 0.407 0.491 0.318 0.466 







*, **, *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
On average, MNCs are shown to have higher agency costs of debt, lower business risk, 
larger firm size, lower tangibility, and higher profitability than DCs. These differences are found to 
be consistent with existing literature. Table 3 provides the correlation analysis for the observed 
explanatory variables. The correlation coefficients are generally below 0.40 and consistent for all 




4.2 Analysis by MNCs and DC 
 
Hausman test consistently support the fixed effects over random effects panel data regressions. 
These findings are in line with Doukas and Pantzalis (2003). They find that the fixed effects model 
better explains their dataset in examining the effect of the agency costs of debt on leverage caused 
by internationalization. Table 3 reports the estimates of fixed effects panel data regression.  
 
Panel A shows that agency costs is inversely related to MNCs long-term debt ratio, 
significant at the 1% level, which is consistent across the samples, and also with previous studies 
(Akhtar and Oliver, 2009; Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997; Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; Fatemi, 
1988; Lee and Kwok, 1988). Similarly, negative relationship is reported for DC. Nonetheless, 
business risk is found to be insignificant for MNCs and DCs. Degree of internationalization is also 
found to have insignificant effects on the long-term debt level of MNCs. In Panel B, we add the 
non-linearity of degree of internationalization to control for any potential non-linear relationship 
between the degree of internationalization and leverage. The square of foreign sales ratio is 
included to proxy for non-linear degree of internationalization. Estimates show that the insignificant 
degree of internationalization in Panel A is not caused by the perceived non-linear relationship.  
 
For the control variables, only size and profitability have the predicted significant effects on 
MNCs’ leverage. Larger size MNCs (except MNC50) tend to use long-term debt financing because 
these firms are expected to have lower financial distress costs and face less information asymmetry 
(Deesomsak et al., 2004). Conversely, profitable MNCs have lower long-term debt because retained 
earnings are the preferred financing choice for these firms. As for the DCs, the leverage decision is 
significantly affected by the firm size, tangibility, and profitability as expected, which support the 
trade-off theory and pecking order hypothesis.  
Panel B: Mean difference 
   
Variables 










Long-term debt ratio -0.031*** -8.434 -0.034*** -8.472 -0.030*** -5.420 
Convertible debt ratio 0.006*** 4.134 0.007*** 4.356 0.012*** 4.579 
Non-convertible debt ratio -0.038*** -10.072 -0.041*** -10.365 -0.042*** -7.819 
Agency cost 0.046*** 2.681 0.054*** 2.888 0.557** 2.096 
Business risk -0.426*** -5.851 -0.416*** -5.587 -0.368*** -4.039 
Size 1.405*** 33.105 1.468*** 31.525 1.344*** 21.376 
Tangibility -0.138*** -25.384 -0.143*** -25.055 -0.123*** -17.154 
Profitability 0.036*** 10.353 0.033*** 9.219 0.026*** 6.127 
Dummy Both 0.057*** 6.654 0.062*** 6.422 0.066*** 4.792 
Dummy crisis 0.013 1.133 0.017 1.358 0.025 1.473 
Quantitative easing 0.035*** 3.055 0.050*** 3.917 0.089*** 4.957 
 
Table 2 
Correlation Matrix of the Observed Variables for MNC10 and DC 
 
Panel A: MNC10  
  
 












Degree of internationalization 
(DOI)   
 
    
  
Agency cost 1.000 
 
 
    
  
Business risk 0.056*** 1.000  
    
  
Degree of internationalization 
(DOI) 
0.070*** 0.021 1.000       
Size 0.108*** -0.035** 0.039** 1.000 
   
  
Tangibility -0.050*** 0.012 -0.022 0.174*** 1.000 
  
  
Profitability 0.214*** -0.036** 0.007 0.252*** 0.069*** 1.000 
 
  
Dummy both -0.023 0.042** 0.019 0.125*** -0.049*** -0.093*** 1.000   
Dummy crisis -0.003 0.026 0.058*** 0.038** -0.035** 0.001 0.030* 1.000  
Quantitative easing (QE) -0.037** -0.014 0.106*** 0.078*** 0.078*** -0.019* -0.036** -0.014 1.000 
   
 
    
  
Panel B: DCs 
  
 










Agency cost 1.000 
 
       
Business risk 0.144*** 1.000        
Size -0.024 -0.132*** 1.000       
Tangibility -0.106*** -0.037** 0.139*** 1.000      
Profitability -0.109*** -0.351*** 0.241*** 0.098*** 1.000     
Dummy both 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.092*** -0.024 -0.112*** 1.000    
Dummy crisis -0.034* -0.009 0.049*** 0.000 -0.039** -0.004 1.000   
Quantitative easing (QE) -0.026 -0.023 0.086*** 0.0085 -0.034** -0.005 0.027 1.000  
 









Analysis by MNCs and DCs on Leverage and Types of Debt 
Panel A: Model 1             
 MNC10 MNC25 MNC50 DC 
 LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV 
Agency cost -0.046*** -0.002 -0.044*** -0.038*** 0.001 -0.040*** -0.033*** 0.005 -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.003*** -0.033*** 
 (13.91) (1.08) (14.21) (10.02) (0.82) (11.02) (5.77) (1.63) (7.39) (10.70) (2.96) (9.89) 
Business risk -0.026 -0.010 -0.016 -0.031 -0.000 -0.031 0.057 0.072*** -0.014 0.001 -0.000 0.001* 
 (1.11) (1.00) (0.71) (1.23) (0.01) (1.30) (1.54) (3.64) (0.43) (1.59) (0.98) (1.91) 
Degree of 
internationalization 
-0.024 0.015 -0.040* 0.005 0.028** -0.023 0.047 0.057* -0.009    
 (1.11) (1.61) (1.93) (0.20) (2.25) (0.92) (0.85) (1.91) (0.18)    
Size 0.009* -0.006*** 0.015*** 0.013** -0.008*** 0.020*** 0.010 -0.006 0.015 0.025*** -0.003** 0.028*** 
 (1.73) (2.84) (3.16) (2.22) (2.84) (3.77) (0.87) (0.97) (1.55) (5.13) (1.99) (5.80) 
Tangibility 0.030 -0.049*** 0.079** 0.049 -0.061*** 0.110*** -0.012 -0.109*** 0.097 0.194*** -0.016 0.209*** 
 (0.80) (2.97) (2.24) (1.11) (2.95) (2.65) (0.17) (2.84) (1.49) (6.32) (1.65) (6.89) 
Profitability -0.241*** -0.077*** -0.164*** -0.390*** -0.148*** -0.242*** -0.389*** -0.218*** -0.171*** -0.118*** -0.019*** -0.099*** 
 (10.78) (7.81) (7.75) (11.86) (9.56) (7.79) (7.55) (8.01) (3.70) (7.93) (4.23) (6.70) 
Dummy both 0.030*** 0.063*** -0.033*** 0.035*** 0.062*** -0.026*** 0.017 0.046*** -0.029*** 0.053*** 0.094*** -0.041*** 
 (5.34) (25.24) (6.18) (5.45) (20.16) (4.29) (1.59) (8.28) (3.11) (6.90) (39.68) (5.38) 
Dummy crisis 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.014*** 0.002 0.012*** 
 (0.91) (0.84) (0.57) (0.87) (0.45) (0.70) (0.41) (0.64) (0.07) (3.43) (1.45) (3.01) 
Quantitative easing 0.000 -0.003* 0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 0.014*** 0.001 0.014*** 
 (0.04) (1.88) (0.92) (0.24) (1.57) (1.03) (1.31) (1.16) (0.78) (3.40) (0.41) (3.31) 
Constant 0.165*** 0.072*** 0.092** 0.110** 0.079*** 0.030 0.115 0.051 0.064 -0.003 0.035*** -0.038 
 (4.03) (4.01) (2.39) (2.28) (3.50) (0.67) (1.25) (1.05) (0.78) (0.08) (3.30) (1.11) 
Adjusted R² -0.10 0.00 -0.11 -0.09 -0.01 -0.13 -0.24 -0.16 -0.27 -0.09 0.22 -0.12 





Panel B:Model 2 
 MNC10 MNC25 MNC50 DC 
 LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV 
Agency cost -0.046*** -0.002 -0.044*** -0.038*** 0.001 -0.040*** -0.034*** 0.005 -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.003*** -0.033*** 
 (13.91) (1.08) (14.21) (10.01) (0.82) (11.01) (5.81) (1.58) (7.40) (10.70) (2.96) (9.89) 
Business risk -0.026 -0.010 -0.016 -0.031 0.000 -0.031 0.059 0.073*** -0.014 0.001 -0.000 0.001* 
 (1.11) (1.00) (0.70) (1.21) (0.00) (1.28) (1.58) (3.69) (0.41) (1.59) (0.98) (1.91) 
Degree of 
internationalization 
-0.001 0.015 -0.016 0.070 0.041 0.029 -0.522 -0.257 -0.265    




-0.023 0.000 -0.023 -0.058 -0.011 -0.047 0.401 0.221 0.180    
 (0.36) (0.02) (0.39) (0.65) (0.27) (0.55) (1.34) (1.39) (0.67)    
Size 0.009* -0.006*** 0.015*** 0.013** -0.008*** 0.020*** 0.011 -0.005 0.016 0.025*** -0.003** 0.028*** 
 (1.72) (2.83) (3.14) (2.18) (2.85) (3.73) (0.96) (0.88) (1.59) (5.13) (1.99) (5.80) 
Tangibility 0.030 -0.049*** 0.079** 0.048 -0.062*** 0.109*** -0.008 -0.106*** 0.099 0.194*** -0.016 0.209*** 
 (0.79) (2.97) (2.23) (1.08) (2.96) (2.62) (0.11) (2.78) (1.52) (6.32) (1.65) (6.89) 
Profitability -0.240*** -0.077*** -0.163*** -0.389*** -0.148*** -0.241*** -0.392*** -0.220*** -0.172*** -0.118*** -0.019*** -0.099*** 
 (10.74) (7.80) (7.71) (11.78) (9.52) (7.73) (7.60) (8.06) (3.72) (7.93) (4.23) (6.70) 
Dummy both 0.030*** 0.063*** -0.033*** 0.035*** 0.062*** -0.026*** 0.017 0.046*** -0.029*** 0.053*** 0.094*** -0.041*** 
 (5.34) (25.24) (6.17) (5.45) (20.16) (4.28) (1.59) (8.30) (3.10) (6.90) (39.68) (5.38) 
Dummy crisis 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.014*** 0.002 0.012*** 
 (0.90) (0.84) (0.56) (0.84) (0.44) (0.67) (0.45) (0.69) (0.10) (3.43) (1.45) (3.01) 
Quantitative easing 0.000 -0.003* 0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 0.014*** 0.001 0.014*** 
 (0.02) (1.87) (0.90) (0.20) (1.58) (1.00) (1.15) (0.99) (0.69) (3.40) (0.41) (3.31) 
Constant 0.160*** 0.073*** 0.088** 0.095* 0.077*** 0.019 0.302* 0.154* 0.148 -0.003 0.035*** -0.038 
 (3.77) (3.85) (2.19) (1.79) (3.06) (0.37) (1.80) (1.74) (0.99) (0.08) (3.30) (1.11) 
Adjusted R² -0.10 0.00 -0.11 -0.09 -0.01 -0.13 -0.24 -0.15 -0.27 -0.09 0.22 -0.12 
N 3,449 3,449 3,449 2,425 2,425 2,425 949 949 949 3,328 3,328 3,328 
 
*, **,  *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
  
 
Interesting findings are observed when we examine the debt structure of MNCs by 
convertible and non-convertible debt. The estimates show that both MNCs and DCs decrease their 
long-term debt by decreasing non-convertible debt as the agency costs increases, which is 
consistently significant at the 1% level. Nonetheless, the negative impact of agency costs on long-
term debt is alleviated by convertible debt suggested by the positive coefficient (though 
insignificant), specifically at a higher degree of internationalization (MNC50). But for the DCs, the 
decrease in long-term debt is intensified by the decrease in convertible debt, significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
Riskier MNCs, for example those in MNC50 are found to prefer convertible debt to mitigate 
the increased risk associated with the greater extent of internationalization. But, this relationship is 
insignificant for DCs. Degree of internationalization is positively related to convertible debt, 
significant at the 5% level for MNC25, but the significant level decreases to 10% for MNC50. 
Conversely, negative relationship is reported between the degree of internationalization and non-
convertible debt only for MNC10, marginally significant at the 10% level.   
 
Taken together, MNCs’ level of convertible debt is positively affected by the degree of 
internationalization but the relative impact decreases as the degree of internationalization increases 
from 25% (MNC25) to 50% (MNC50). As MNCs further increase their extent of 
internationalization to 50% or more, business risk becomes the key consideration that influence 
MNCs’ decision to use convertible debt to mitigate the higher expected financial distress costs. 
Consequently, MNCs are able to moderate the negative impact on long-term debt as business risk 
increases. These findings remain consistent for Model 2 (Panel B).  
 
For the control variables, the coefficients are mostly significant and consistent with the 
hypothesized signs. For example, MNCs with smaller firm size, lower tangibility and less profitable 
prefer convertible debt and the opposite for non-convertible debt. The same findings also apply for 
DCs. But, as the degree of internationalization increases to 50% or more, the relative impact of 
business risk outweighs the impact of firm size in affecting the level of convertible debt. Probably 
this trade off implies that at a higher level of internationalization, convertible debt is not only 
preferred by the smaller size MNCs but also the larger size MNCs to mitigate the increasing 
business risk.  
 
Our results remain consistent even controlling for market conditions. Global financial crisis 
is found to have insignificant effect on the MNCs’ long-term debt ratio and choice between 
convertible and non-convertible debt. But, during the subsequent quantitative easing period, MNCs 
in MNC10 are found to use less convertible debt, indicated by the marginally significant negative 
coefficient at the 10% level. But as the extent of internationalization increases, the effects of this 
policy on the decision to issue convertible debt becomes insignificant. We argue that convertible 
debt is still the preferred choice when the relative impact of agency costs and business risk are 
greater than the impact of quantitative easing policy as the degree of internationalization increases. 
But these two market variables are shown to have positive effects on DCs’ long-term debt ratio, 
which is contributed by the use of non-convertible debt.  
 
4.3 Comparison between NASDAQ and non-NASDAQ-listed Firms 
 
Convertible debt issuers are claimed to be smaller and riskier growth firms (Lewis et al., 1999), thus 
are more reluctant to issue straight debt because higher fixed debt obligation tends to increase the 
expected cost of financial distress. Moreover, these firms would not issue equity if the current stock 
price does not reflect the firms’ growth opportunities (Chang et al., 2004; Stein, 1992). In order to 
take this argument into consideration, we distinguish MNCs and DCs by NASDAQ and non-
NASDAQ-listed firms. NASDAQ provides a platform for small firms and venture-capital firms, 
 
Table 4 
Analysis by NASDAQ and non-NASDAQ-listed MNCs and DCs on Leverage and Types of Debt 
 
Panel A: NASDAQ-listed firms 
 
MNC10 MNC25 MNC50 DC 




0.003 -0.030*** -0.011 0.011** -0.022*** 0.008 0.019** -0.011* -0.029*** -0.002 -0.027*** 
 (4.18) (0.72) (5.47) (1.46) (2.18) (3.48) (0.82) (2.38) (1.79) (6.59) (1.35) (6.28) 
Business risk -0.037 -0.032* -0.005 -0.028 -0.023 -0.005 0.038 0.038 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001* 
 (1.45) (1.94) (0.22) (0.98) (1.19) (0.21) (0.94) (1.13) (0.01) (1.37) (0.93) (1.75) 
Degree of  
internationalization 
-0.015 0.004 -0.020 0.026 0.012 0.014 -0.047 0.022 -0.069    
 (0.38) (0.17) (0.58) (0.53) (0.36) (0.33) (0.50) (0.28) (1.12)    
Size  0.016* -0.000 0.017** 0.013 -0.000 0.013 0.036* 0.018 0.017 0.035*** -0.006*** 0.041*** 
 (1.80) (0.07) (2.17) (1.21) (0.01) (1.44) (1.77) (1.08) (1.31) (5.19) (2.60) (6.29) 
Tangibility -0.048 -0.162*** 0.114 -0.022 -0.192** 0.170* 0.064 -0.039 0.103 0.263*** 0.004 0.259*** 




-0.178*** -0.096*** -0.248*** -0.194*** -0.054 -0.352*** -0.314*** -0.038 -0.078*** -0.018*** -0.061*** 
 (6.91) (6.91) (2.85) (5.36) (6.17) (1.39) (5.23) (5.56) (0.86) (4.76) (3.00) (3.79) 
Dummy both 0.019* 0.044*** -0.025*** 0.012 0.037*** -0.024** -0.019 -0.020 0.001 0.048*** 0.102*** -0.054*** 
 (1.68) (6.05) (2.65) (0.91) (4.01) (2.15) (0.90) (1.15) (0.10) (3.98) (23.95) (4.68) 
Dummy crisis -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.004 0.009 0.010 -0.000 0.010 0.010* 0.002 0.009 
 (0.10) (0.45) (0.23) (0.70) (0.78) (1.46) (0.88) (0.05) (1.40) (1.80) (0.83) (1.55) 
Quantitative  
easing 
-0.010 -0.011*** 0.001 -0.007 -0.010* 0.003 -0.013 -0.017* 0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.005 
 (1.57) (2.59) (0.13) (0.86) (1.80) (0.44) (1.09) (1.77) (0.60) (0.57) (0.54) (0.78) 
Constant 0.091 0.078* 0.013 0.068 0.071 -0.003 -0.065 -0.078 0.012 -0.071* 0.046*** -0.117*** 
 (1.37) (1.80) (0.24) (0.87) (1.34) (0.05) (0.49) (0.69) (0.14) (1.73) (3.12) (2.92) 
Adjusted R² -0.26 -0.24 -0.30 -0.39 -0.32 -0.41 -0.44 -0.38 -0.62 -0.14 0.12 -0.15 






Panel B: Non-NASDAQ-listed firms 
 
MNC10 MNC25 MNC50 DC 
LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV 
Agency cost -0.054*** -0.004*** -0.050*** -0.047*** -0.003** -0.044*** -0.055*** -0.003 -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.005*** -0.040*** 
 (13.98) (3.05) (13.29) (10.63) (2.01) (10.13) (7.69) (1.20) (7.57) (8.61) (3.59) (7.63) 
Business risk -0.107 0.042* -0.149* -0.160* 0.114*** -0.274*** -0.213 0.136*** -0.349*** 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
 (1.35) (1.71) (1.91) (1.73) (3.53) (3.02) (1.53) (3.01) (2.60) (0.94) (0.93) (1.17) 
Degree of  
internationalization 
-0.034 0.025*** -0.060** -0.026 0.035*** -0.061** 0.035 0.021 0.015    
 (1.33) (3.17) (2.35) (0.82) (3.27) (2.00) (0.50) (0.90) (0.22)    
Size  0.004 -0.008*** 0.012** 0.012* -0.011*** 0.022*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.014 0.014** 0.001 0.013* 
 (0.71) (4.41) (2.11) (1.72) (4.64) (3.41) (0.11) (2.79) (1.06) (1.99) (0.40) (1.87) 
Tangibility 0.049 -0.019 0.068* 0.044 -0.031* 0.075 -0.044 -0.127*** 0.083 0.102** -0.038*** 0.140*** 
 (1.19) (1.53) (1.70) (0.94) (1.90) (1.63) (0.54) (4.80) (1.06) (2.40) (3.44) (3.26) 
Profitability -0.226*** -0.027*** -0.199*** -0.599*** -0.095*** -0.504*** -0.426*** -0.098*** -0.329*** -0.350*** -0.018* -0.333*** 
 (8.27) (3.15) (7.43) (12.22) (5.57) (10.50) (5.55) (3.91) (4.44) (9.75) (1.89) (9.20) 
Dummy both 0.035*** 0.070*** -0.035*** 0.043*** 0.071*** -0.028*** 0.027** 0.069*** -0.042*** 0.059*** 0.089*** -0.030*** 
 (5.39) (34.96) (5.51) (5.85) (28.03) (3.98) (2.23) (17.70) (3.65) (5.94) (34.88) (3.05) 
Dummy crisis 0.004 0.002* 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004* -0.004 0.015*** 0.002 0.013** 
 (1.17) (1.73) (0.64) (0.69) (1.61) (0.13) (0.06) (1.69) (0.51) (2.85) (1.41) (2.47) 
Quantitative  
easing 
0.005 -0.000 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.004 0.002 -0.006 0.020*** 0.002 0.018*** 
 (1.30) (0.37) (1.44) (1.04) (0.83) (1.36) (0.49) (0.69) (0.74) (3.54) (1.43) (3.15) 
Constant 0.215*** 0.066*** 0.149*** 0.165*** 0.087*** 0.078 0.244* 0.128*** 0.116 0.121** 0.018 0.102* 
 (4.16) (4.14) (2.94) (2.75) (4.17) (1.33) (1.96) (3.17) (0.97) (2.18) (1.29) (1.83) 
Adjusted R² -0.03 0.26 -0.04 0.05 0.25 0.01 -0.11 0.23 -0.11 0.00 0.37 -0.04 
N 2,410 2,410 2,410 1,718 1,718 1,718 650 650 650 1,664 1,664 1,664 
 
*, **,  *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
  
 
mostly the high-tech and high growth firms to raise funds (Loughran, 1997; Schwert, 2002). If 
smaller and riskier growth firms tend to issue convertible debt, then NASDAQ-listed MNCs and 
DCs are expected to use more convertible debt and less non-convertible debt in the presence of 
agency costs and business risk. 
 
Table 4 reports the results for NASDAQ-listed firms (Panel A) and non-NASDAQ-listed 
firms (Panel B). In the presence of agency costs, NASDAQ-listed MNCs and DCs decrease their 
long-term debt by decreasing non-convertible debt. Nonetheless, NASDAQ-listed MNCs, those in 
MNC25 and MNC50 are found to mitigate the negative effects of agency costs by issuing 
convertible debt. Results also indicate the importance of agency costs in influencing NASDAQ-
listed MNCs’ levels of convertible debt when the measure of internationalization increases to 25% 
and more. But, insignificant result is observed for the NASDAQ-listed DCs. 
 
In comparison, non-NASDAQ-listed MNCs, in particular MNC10 and MNC25, use 
convertible debt to mitigate the negative effect on long-term debt as the degree of 
internationalization increases. Also, these MNCs opt for convertible debt as business risk 
increases.This implies that non-NASDAQ-listed MNCs issue convertible debt to mitigate the risk 
associated with higher degree of internationalization. Reasonably, MNCs face additional financial 
distress costs, such as exchange rate risk and political risk, as they further expand their business 
abroad. Hence, MNCs are less likely to issue debt with higher fixed obligation such as straight debt 
(Jen, et al., 1997) or equivalent non-convertible debt. 
 
For the non-NASDAQ-listed DCs, business risk has insignificant effect on the long-term 
debt as well as the choice between convertible and non-convertible debt. Instead, as the agency 
costs of debt increases, DCs decrease their long-term debt by decreasing both the convertible and 
non-convertible debt. In brief, NASDAQ-listed MNCs that are more likely to be smaller and riskier 
growth firms tend to issue convertible debt to the mitigate agency costs of debt that arises from 
international diversification. On the contrary, non-NASDAQ-listed MNCs issue convertible debt to 
mitigate the risk associated with the increasing degree of internationalization. But these findings are 
not applicable for the NASDAQ and non-NASDAQ-listed DCs. Therefore, these results indicate 
that the decision to issue convertible debt is also linked to internationalization.  
 
4.4 Comparison between Small and Large Size Firms 
 
Firm size is found to have significant effect on firms’ leverage. Large size firms are more mature 
and established, thus are able to tolerate higher leverage, given the lower financial distress costs 
(Lewis et al., 1999; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Large firms are claimed to 
prefer straight debt or the equivalent non-convertible debt as compared to small firms that are more 
likely to issue convertible debt (Lewis et al., 1999). Therefore, to examine the potential effects of 
firm size on debt structure in relation to the degree of internationalization, we rank the MNCs and 
DCs by their total assets to classify the firms into Bottom30 and Top30 accordingly. For the 
Bottom30, it consists of firms with total assets of approximately $446 million to $10 million, 
whereas for the Top30, it consists of firms with total assets of approximately $2,822 million and 
above.  
 
Table 5 reports the results for Bottom30 (Panel A) and Top30 (Panel B) firms.  For the 
Bottom30 MNCs, convertible debt is positively affected by the business risk and firm size. As 
business risk increases, MNCs; those in MNC10 and MNC25 tend to have convertible debt in their 
debt structure, significant at the 1% level. Additionally, larger size MNCs in Bottom30 are found to 
use convertible debt instead of non-convertible debt, but it is the opposite for DCs. Conversely, 
Bottom30 MNCs decrease their non-convertible debt to mitigate the negative effects of agency 
 
Table 5 
Analysis by Small and Large Size MNCs and DCs on Leverage and Types of Debt 
 
Panel A: Bottom30 firms 
 MNC10 MNC25 MNC50 DC 
 LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV 
Agency costs -0.038*** -0.002 -0.036*** -0.033*** 0.004 -0.037*** -0.015 0.011 -0.026** -0.033*** -0.002 -0.031*** 
 (5.42) (0.48) (5.70) (3.93) (0.88) (4.88) (1.41) (1.50) (2.59) (7.18) (1.36) (6.92) 
Degree of 
internationalization 
-0.073 -0.008 -0.065 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.085 -0.077 -0.008    
 (1.55) (0.35) (1.51) (0.00) (0.08) (0.04) (0.80) (1.10) (0.08)    
Business risk 0.047 0.051*** -0.004 0.046 0.041*** 0.005 0.042 0.041 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001* 
 (1.48) (3.19) (0.13) (1.53) (2.63) (0.18) (1.01) (1.50) (0.02) (1.42) (1.16) (1.82) 
Size 0.040*** 0.019*** 0.021* 0.050*** 0.029*** 0.021 0.096*** 0.058*** 0.038 0.026*** -0.003 0.029*** 
 (2.91) (2.79) (1.66) (3.36) (3.70) (1.59) (3.00) (2.74) (1.29) (3.31) (1.11) (3.74) 
Tangibility 0.068 -0.110 0.178 0.067 -0.165** 0.232 -0.263 -0.389** 0.126 0.216*** -0.008 0.225*** 
 (0.50) (1.61) (1.44) (0.43) (2.01) (1.64) (0.91) (2.04) (0.47) (5.23) (0.67) (5.56) 
Profitability -0.134*** -0.080*** -0.054 -0.195*** -0.174*** -0.021 -0.337*** -0.309*** -0.028 -0.107*** -0.017*** -0.090*** 
 (2.67) (3.20) (1.17) (3.59) (6.11) (0.44) (4.64) (6.43) (0.41) (5.41) (2.86) (4.64) 
Dummy both 0.041** 0.051*** -0.010 0.036* 0.037*** -0.000 0.084** 0.039* 0.044 0.071*** 0.108*** -0.037*** 
 (2.20) (5.42) (0.57) (1.74) (3.37) (0.02) (2.53) (1.79) (1.46) (4.91) (24.41) (2.65) 
Dummy crisis 0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.007 -0.008 0.015* 0.003 -0.012 0.015 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.54) (0.43) (0.83) (0.77) (1.64) (1.81) (0.21) (1.14) (1.05) (0.18) (0.99) (0.13) 
Quantitative easing -0.027*** -0.013*** -0.015* -0.029*** -0.015*** -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (3.03) (2.79) (1.79) (2.85) (2.89) (1.49) (1.01) (1.14) (0.28) (0.04) (0.60) (0.14) 
Constant -0.015 -0.048 0.033 -0.112 -0.092* -0.021 -0.253 -0.148 -0.105 -0.011 0.023* -0.034 
 (0.17) (1.11) (0.43) (1.22) (1.90) (0.25) (1.30) (1.15) (0.58) (0.26) (1.88) (0.86) 
Adjusted R² -0.33 -0.28 -0.40 -0.34 -0.11 -0.46 -0.07 0.13 -0.65 -0.23 0.12 -0.25 






*, **,  *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively 
 
Panel B: Top30 firms 
 MNC10 MNC25 MNC50 DC 
 LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV LTDebt CNV NonCNV 
Agency costs -0.044*** -0.001 -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.002 -0.041*** -0.036*** -0.000 -0.035*** -0.017* -0.003** -0.014 
 (9.23) (0.91) (9.03) (8.15) (1.04) (7.93) (4.39) (0.02) (4.46) (1.90) (2.40) (1.48) 
Business risk -0.032 0.055** -0.087 -0.006 0.114*** -0.121 -0.265* 0.096* -0.361*** 0.013 0.009 0.004 
 (0.46) (2.40) (1.26) (0.07) (3.75) (1.47) (1.93) (1.85) (2.68) (0.28) (1.27) (0.08) 
Degree of 
internationalization 
-0.020 0.013 -0.033 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.039 -0.025    
 (0.61) (1.17) (1.01) (0.35) (0.50) (0.17) (0.16) (1.19) (0.30)    
Size 0.009 -0.009*** 0.017** 0.019** -0.013*** 0.032*** 0.049*** -0.011 0.060*** 0.043*** 0.002 0.041*** 
 (1.14) (3.36) (2.27) (2.14) (4.00) (3.67) (2.66) (1.58) (3.32) (3.01) (0.79) (2.80) 
Tangibility 0.067 -0.037** 0.104** 0.062 -0.074*** 0.136** -0.021 -0.078* 0.056 0.265*** -0.004 0.269*** 
 (1.25) (2.14) (1.98) (0.98) (3.22) (2.20) (0.20) (1.89) (0.53) (2.93) (0.31) (2.89) 
Profitability -0.515*** -0.117*** -0.397*** -0.451*** -0.139*** -0.312*** -0.573*** -0.207*** -0.366*** -0.512*** 0.004 -0.516*** 
 (10.98) (7.62) (8.57) (8.80) (7.45) (6.22) (5.73) (5.46) (3.72) (5.83) (0.30) (5.69) 
Dummy both 0.023*** 0.050*** -0.027*** 0.040*** 0.055*** -0.015* 0.001 0.048*** -0.047*** -0.030* 0.037*** -0.067*** 
 (3.08) (20.50) (3.70) (4.71) (17.74) (1.79) (0.08) (8.22) (3.09) (1.75) (13.90) (3.78) 
Dummy crisis 0.004 0.002* 0.001 0.002 0.003** -0.001 -0.005 0.005 -0.010 0.035*** -0.001 0.037*** 
 (0.96) (1.84) (0.36) (0.50) (2.11) (0.28) (0.61) (1.56) (1.22) (4.49) (0.95) (4.50) 
Quantitative easing 0.007 -0.002 0.010** 0.005 -0.003 0.008 -0.017 0.001 -0.018* 0.028*** 0.001 0.028*** 
 (1.57) (1.55) (2.11) (0.89) (1.47) (1.46) (1.61) (0.22) (1.72) (3.32) (0.49) (3.15) 
Constant 0.164** 0.096*** 0.068 0.046 0.147*** -0.101 -0.165 0.111 -0.276 -0.224 -0.008 -0.216 
 (2.15) (3.81) (0.90) (0.53) (4.59) (1.17) (0.88) (1.56) (1.49) (1.58) (0.36) (1.48) 
Adjusted R² 0.01 0.15 -0.02 0.00 0.15 -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 -0.11 0.03 0.14 0.03 
N 1,459 1,459 1,459 1,056 1,056 1,056 373 373 373 574 574 574 
 
costs, but the net negative effects on the long-term debt can be moderated by convertible 
debt as the MNCs further expand their operations internationally.   
 
For the Top30 MNCs, business risk is positively related to convertible debt. Consistently, 
MNCs are found to use convertible debt instead of non-convertible debt to mitigate the negative 
effect of business risk on the long-term debt. Agency costs of debt are found to have insignificant 
effect on the MNCs’ levels of convertible debt, but it has significantly negative effect on the DCs’ 
levels of convertible debt. Taken together, these findings suggest that the decision to use convertible 





Conceptually, MNCs are able to sustain higher levels of long-term debt than DCs because MNCs 
are of larger firm size, have lower bankruptcy risk and greater access to international capital 
markets. Nonetheless, empirical evidence has shown otherwise. One key limitation is these studies 
assume long-term debt as homogenous. Motivated by this limitation and the differences between 
MNCs and DCs, as well as the increasing importance of globalised markets due to trade 
liberalization, this study examines the debt financing decision of MNCs when the analyses are 
extended to account for debt heterogeneity.  
  
 This study recognizes the long-term debt by convertible and non convertible debt because 
the embedded equity option of convertible debt is claimed to be able to mitigate agency costs of 
debt and business risk. Results show that MNCs decrease the levels of long-term debt by decreasing 
non-convertible to mitigate agency costs of debt and business risk. But, the net decrease in the long-
term debt is moderated by the increase in the levels of convertible debt. The findings of this study 
provide a significant justification that allows MNCs to sustain higher levels of long-term debt. In 
brief, MNCs can use convertible debt to mitigate the increasing agency costs of debt and business 
risk to maximize the benefits of internationalization.  
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